Defeasibility in legal theory: What is actually defeasible? Doc. Mgr. Marek Káčer, PhD., Institute of State and Law of Slovak Academy of Sciences Právny obzor, 100, 2017, special issue, pp. 28-40. Published online: 15.1.2018 Abstract. To what entities can we attribute the property of defeasibility in the domain of legal theory? This paper tries to answer the question by examining whether defeasible are legal concepts, legal rules, legal conclusions or legal institutions. The paper concludes in suggestion that all of the enumerated candidates can be considered to be defeasible. Keywords: Application of law, defeasibility, legal concepts, legal pluralism, sequential reasoning, subsumption syllogism
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ISSN 2729-9228 ISSN 0032-6984
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